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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)Q).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The Russells' stipulated dismissal with prejudice of their claims against the

Backman Defendants for restitution and civil conspiracy is not subject to appeal.
Preservation Below: The stipulation of the Russells and the Backman Defendants
and the district court's subsequent entry of an order of dismissal with prejudice can be
found in the record on appeal ("R.") at 1014, 1017-18. By its nature, the issue of whether
a voluntary dismissal and subsequent order may be appealed has arisen for the first time
on appeal.
Standard of Appellate Review: Whether a party may appeal from a stipulated
dismissal with prejudice is a question of law which this Court must resolve in the first
instance. As explained below, a stipulated dismissal with prejudice is not subject to
appeal. See Cornia v. Cornia, 15 P.2d 631, 632 (Utah 1932); see infra, at 12-13.
2.

With respect to the Backman Defendants, the Russells waived any

argument that the trial court improperly dismissed their claims for restitution, unjust
enrichment, and punitive damages because they failed to address those issues in their
opening brief.
Preservation Below: The district court dismissed these claims pursuant to a
motion for judgment on the pleadings or motion for summary judgment. R. 286, 981,

1

995-1002. On appeal, the Russells have not briefed or argued the correctness of these
rulings.
Standard of Appellate Review: By its nature, this issue has arisen for the first time
on appeal and thus was not before the trial court. As discussed below, the Russells'
failure to challenge the district court's rulings on these claims constitutes the
abandonment of these claims on appeal. See infra, at 14-15.
3.

The Russells' claim against the Backman Defendants for violation of the

Utah Unfair Practices Act was properly dismissed on the pleadings because the Russells
lack standing to bring their claim.
Preservation Below: This issue was the subject of the Backman Defendants'
motion for judgment on the pleadings and associated memoranda. R. 861-63, 964-970.
Standard of Appellate Review: The granting of a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is reviewed on appeal for correctness. Houghton v. Department of Health,
2002 UT 101, U 7, 57 P.3d 1067; see also infra at 16-17 (discussing additional standards
on appeal).
IMPORTANT STATUTORY PROVISION
For the Court's convenience, the Utah Unfair Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. §§
13-5-1 et seq^ is set forth in the Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
Plaintiffs-appellants James R. Russell and Raylene Russell (the "Russells") appeal

from the dismissal of their claims against three groups of defendants: (1) J. Scott
2

Lundberg and his law firm, Lundberg & Associations (collectively the "Lundberg
Defendants"), (2) Rodney Services Company ("Rodney"), and (3) Backman Title
Company, Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd., and Canyon Anderson (collectively the
"Backman Defendants"). This brief is limited to issues pertaining to the Backman
Defendants.
Through fifteen "causes of action," the Russells seek to challenge the non-judicial
foreclosure practices of the Lundberg Defendants. The Russells allege that the Lundberg
Defendants charge lenders excessive fees and costs for foreclosure services, resulting in
persons like the Russells overpaying to reinstate loans in default. The Backman
Defendants often provide title work and title insurance to the Lundberg Defendants in
connection with their foreclosure practice. The Russells seek to hold the Backman
Defendants liable for allegedly facilitating the Lundberg Defendants' purported
overcharges. The Russells attempted to bring six claims against the Backman
Defendants: (1) restitution - mistake of fact, (2) restitution - mistake of law, (3) unjust
enrichment, (4) civil conspiracy, (5) violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act, and (6)
punitive damages.
The Russells voluntarily dismissed with prejudice the two restitution claims and
the civil conspiracy claim against the Backman Defendants. Of the three remaining
claims, the district court dismissed one on the pleadings (violation of the Utah Unfair
Practices Act) and two others on summary judgment (unjust enrichment and punitive
damages). The Russells appeal. In their docketing statement on appeal, the Russells
appeared to seek reinstatement of all their claims. See Russells' Docketing Statement
3

dated Nov. 18, 2003, at 3,ffl[4, 6. However, with the exception of the Unfair Practices
Act claim, on appeal the Russells have not argued the merits of their claims against the
Backman Defendants.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
The Backman Defendants adopt by reference the Lundberg Defendants' statement

of the course of proceedings as it pertains to the Lundberg Defendants and Rodney. See
Brief of Appellees Lundberg Defendants and Rodney ["Lundberg Brf."], at 3-4. The
following statement relates the proceedings relevant to the Backman Defendants.
On February 5, 2002, the Russells filed their complaint alleging fifteen causes of
action, six of which were against the Backman Defendants. R. 1-28. On March 15,
2002, the Backman Defendants filed an answer and an accompanying motion to dismiss
the fifth (mistake of fact), sixth (mistake of law), and thirteenth (civil conspiracy) causes
of action for failing to meet the pleading requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). R. 95121.1 Following oral argument (R. 276), the district court issued a ruling on September
30, 2002 dismissing without prejudice the fifth, sixth and thirteenth causes of action
against the Backman Defendants. R. 286.
On October 25, 2002, the Russells moved the district court for an order certifying
the dismissal of their claims as final for purposes of appeal (R. 295, 300-01), which the
court denied on January 21, 2003. R. 364-65. The Russells also petitioned the Utah

1

The Backman Defendants also argued that the civil conspiracy claim should be
dismissed under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). R. 118-120.
2
The court did not address the merits of the Backman Defendants' 12(b)(6) arguments.
R. 286-87.
4

Supreme Court for permission to appeal an interlocutory order, which was denied in a
notice issued January 23, 2003. R. 368-69.
On February 19, 2003, the Russells filed a motion for class certification. R. 388.
On June 5, 2003, the Backman Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(c) as to the fourteenth cause of action (violation of the Utah
Unfair Practices Act). R. 853, 861. In a ruling issued August 14, 2003, the district court
denied the Russells' motion for class certification and granted the Backman Defendants'
motion for judgment on the pleadings. R. 981, 995-1002. On September 3, 2003, the
Backman Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the eighth (unjust
enrichment) and fifteenth (punitive damages) causes of action (R. 983, 991-92), which
the district court granted in an order dated October 1, 2003. R. 1007.
The Russells filed a notice of appeal on October 14, 2003. R. 1011. On October
28, 2003, the Russells and the Backman Defendants filed a stipulation for dismissal with
prejudice of the fifth (restitution - mistake of fact), sixth (restitution - mistake of law)
and thirteenth (civil conspiracy) causes of action (R. 1014), which the district court
granted in an order issued November 4, 2003. R. 1017-18.
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
For purposes of this appeal, the Backman Defendants adopt by reference the

Statement of Facts of the Lundberg Defendants and Rodney. See Lundberg Brf, at 5-16.
However, because the Russells' action against the Backman Defendants is narrower than
their action against the Lundberg Defendants, many of the facts set forth in the Lundberg

5

Brief do not directly pertain to the Backman Defendants. For the Court's convenience,
the facts related to the Backman Defendants are set forth below.
A.

Background Facts.

The following facts were either undisputed or never properly disputed in the
district court. The Backman Defendants are in the title insurance business. R. 3, ^f 7.
Defendant Backman Title Company is a Utah Corporation and the general partner of
Defendant Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd. ("Backman-Stewart"). R. 2, ^ 4.
Backman-Stewart is a Utah Limited Partnership which does business as a title company
in Utah and serves as an agent for various title insurance companies. R. 664, ^}12; see
also id. at 2, \ 7. Defendant Canyon Anderson is the president, a director, and the
majority shareholder of Backman Title Company. Mr. Anderson is also a partner in
Backman-Stewart. R. 2, \ 6. As set forth in the Lundberg Brief, at 8-9, Defendant Scott
Lundberg has an ownership interest in Backman Title Company and Backman-Stewart.
R. 664, Tf 13; 907, ^ 7. There is no allegation that the Backman Defendants are connected
to Rodney.
Backman-Stewart sells a title insurance product known as a "Trustee's Sale
Guarantee" ("TSG") for use in foreclosures. R. 664, ^[11. As explained in greater detail
in the other parties' briefs, a TSG is similar to a title report but provides additional
liability protection to a trustee or lender engaged in foreclosure proceedings. R. 66364, Tj 8. TSGs are commonly used in the industry and are often required by lenders who
engage trustees to initiate foreclosure proceedings on their behalf. R. 663-64, \ 8. The

6

Utah State Insurance Commission must approve the amount Backman-Stewart and other
title insurance companies can charge for a TSG in Utah. R. 599-600, f 14; 785, *f 14.
The Lundberg Defendants often purchase TSGs from Backman-Stewart in
connection with their foreclosure activities. R. 664. The amount Backman-Stewart
charges the Lundberg Defendants for TSGs is the same amount it charges all others who
purchase TSGs. R. 599-600, <h 14; 785, If 14.
From 1998-2000, the relevant time period in this lawsuit, Backman-Stewart
compensated the Lundberg Defendants for providing legal services such as title curative
work. R. 665, ^ 14; 907, ^ 9. It also paid the Lundberg Defendants commissions in light
of Mr. Lundberg's ownership interest in Backman-Stewart and the large volume of
business the Lundberg Defendants provided. R. 665, f 15. These commissions were not
based on a set percentage of referred business nor were they directly attributable to the
amount the Lundberg Defendants paid to Backman-Stewart to purchase TSGs in any
particular foreclosure. Id. Rather, commissions were determined periodically based on
the extra value to Backman-Stewart of the Lundberg Defendants' extensive business. See
id.
As set forth below, the only alleged tie between the Backman Defendants and the
Russells was the sale of two TSGs to the Lundberg Defendants in connection with the
Russells' second and third foreclosure proceedings. The lender reimbursed the Lundberg
Defendants for the cost of the TSGs and then added that cost to the amount the Russells
owed to reinstate their loan. R. 667-68, 671-83.

7

B.

Factual Allegations Relating to the Russells9 Claim Against the
Backman Defendants for Violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act.

The only facts the Russells allege that are directly relevant to the Backman
Defendants' defense of this appeal are those related to their fourteenth claim for alleged
violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act ("UPA"). As stated above, the district court
dismissed this claim pursuant to the Backman Defendants' motion for judgment on the
pleadings. R. 995-1002. Accordingly, with respect to that claim, the following relevant
allegations in the complaint are assumed true for purposes of this appeal only.
The Russells are individuals residing in Salt Lake County. R. 1. On August 8,
1997, the Russells entered into a trust deed on their home, on which they defaulted three
times between 1997 and 2000. R. 3-5. Three times the Lundberg Defendants, acting as
trustee, initiated foreclosure proceedings against them and three times the Russells paid
the necessary fees and costs to their lender to cure the default and reinstate the loan. R.
3-5. Each time, the costs the Russells were required to pay included the cost for the
Lundberg Defendants to purchase a TSG. Id. The TSG in the first foreclosure cost
$767.00; in the second, $760.00; and in the third, $757.00.3 Id.
The Backman Defendants are in the title insurance business and provide title
insurance services to the Lundberg Defendants in connection with their foreclosure
practice. R. 6, ^ 19. In order to gain the large volume of work the Lundberg Defendants
generate (especially in TSGs), the Backman Defendants allegedly agreed to issue TSGs

3

It is undisputed that the first of these TSGs came from a title company unrelated to the
Backman Defendants. The second and third were purchased from Backman-Stewart. R.
4; 667-68, \ 30.
8

and then pay a commission of 30% of the premiums to the Lundberg Defendants. R. 9,
1f 31. In order to facilitate this arrangement, Mr. Lundberg allegedly became a "30%
owner of the Backman- Stewart title company." R. 95 ^f 32. The Lundberg Defendants
allegedly received commissions on the TSGs purchased in connection with the Russells5
foreclosures. R. 105 ^ 34. The Russells do not specifically allege that the Backman
Defendants paid such commissions in the Russells' case. See R. 80.
Allegedly, because of these commissions the price charged the Lundberg
Defendants "was substantially different than the price charged other persons who ordered
TSGs" in that it "was less than the actual cost of the TSGs to [Backman-Stewart]." R.
25, \ 120; 26, \ 122. The allegedly lower-cost TSGs were available only to the Lundberg
Defendants and purportedly "lessened competition in the title insurance industry" in Utah
"or created a monopoly within the industry" because the Lundberg Defendants would
only use Backman-Stewart for TSGs. R. 26,ffif121; 123. In selling TSGs to the
Lundberg Defendants at less than cost, the Backman Defendants allegedly sought to
induce them to purchase TSGs and other title work from the Backman Defendants "to the
exclusion of other title insurance agencies, or with the intent of impairing or preventing
fair competition within the title insurance industry." R. 26, \ 124. Backman-Stewart's
practice of selling TSGs at below cost to the Lundberg Defendants has allegedly injured
the Russells, though how that has occurred is not specified. R. 26, Tj 125.
IV.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE BACKMAN DEFENDANTS.
In their complaint, the Russells attempted to plead six claims against the Backman

Defendants:
9

1.

"Fifth Cause of Action - Restitution - Mistake of Fact.55 R. 19-20.

2.

"Sixth Cause of Action - Restitution - Mistake of Law.55 R. 20-21.

3.

"Eighth Cause of Action - Unjust Enrichment.55 R. 21-22.

4.

"Thirteenth Cause of Action - Civil Conspiracy.55 R. 25.

5.

"Fourteenth Cause of Action - Violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act.55
R. 25-26.

6.

"Fifteenth Cause of Action - Punitive Damages.55 R. 26-27.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Russells have abandoned all their claims against the Backman Defendants
save one. First, they voluntarily and knowingly stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice
of their restitution and conspiracy claims. Such a dismissal cannot be appealed. Second,
apart from their claim under the Unfair Practices Act, the Russells failed to raise any
arguments on appeal as to why their claims against the Backman Defendants should be
reinstated. An appellant must raise and brief all the grounds for appeal in its opening
brief or else the arguments are waived. Thus, the Russells have waived any argument
that the district court erred in dismissing their non-UPA claims against the Backman
Defendants.
The Russells defend their UP A claim on appeal, but to no avail. They lack
standing to bring such a claim because they have not suffered a competitive injury from
the allegedly illegal Backman-Lundberg commission arrangement. They cannot logically
maintain they have been injured by price discrimination in the TSG market because they
are not purchasers or sellers of TSGs; and, in any event, the Backman Defendants charge

10

everyone the same price for TSGs. There is no price discrimination. The allegation that
Mr. Lundberg, as an owner of Backman-Stewart, receives commissions for the large
amount of title work he brings to Backman-Stewart does not establish an injury to the
Russells. Even if this resulted in below-cost sales of TSGs to the Lundberg Defendants,
such sales could not be illegal unless they produced prices that are so low they harm
competitors. The Russells are not competitors; and, at any rate, they insist that prices for
TSGs are too high, not too low. The most the Russells have alleged is that the BackmanLundberg commission arrangement results in large profits for the Lundberg Defendants.
However, that does not create a competitive injury to the Russells. The Russells lack
standing to bring a damages claim under the UPA.
Alternatively, even if standing is assumed, the Russells have failed to put forth
evidence or any plausible argument that the Backman Defendants' actions have harmed
competitive conditions in the TSG market. Absent such a showing, there can be no claim
against the Backman Defendants under the UPA.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE RUSSELLS HAVE ABANDONED ALL BUT ONE OF THEIR
CLAIMS AGAINST THE BACKMAN DEFENDANTS.
With the exception of their claim under the Utah Unfair Practices Act, the Russells

have abandoned all their claims against the Backman Defendants. This Court should
therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of these claims without inquiry into their
substance.

11

A.

The Russells' Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice of Their Restitution
and Conspiracy Claims Against the Backman Defendants Cannot Be
Appealed.

The Russells stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of their fifth (restitution mistake of fact), sixth (restitution - mistake of law), and thirteenth (civil conspiracy)
causes of action against the Backman Defendants. R. 1014. Pursuant to that stipulation,
the district court entered an order dismissing those claims with prejudice. R. 1017-18.
The Russells' decision to enter into a stipulation of dismissal was voluntary, knowing,
reviewed by legal counsel, and undertaken to advance their litigation strategy.4 The
Russells never requested that the district court rescind the order of dismissal and it
therefore became final.
Although there is no indication in their briefing that the Russells still intend to
appeal their own voluntary dismissal of these claims, out of an abundance of caution the
Backman Defendants note that the district court's order on this issue is not subject to
appeal. Absent unusual circumstances, parties are bound by their stipulations. See First
Denver Mortgage Investors v. C. N. Zundel andAssocs., 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979);
Higley v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1984); Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d
528, 536 (Utah 2000). As far back as Comia v. Cornia, 15 P.2d 631, 632 (Utah 1932),
the Utah Supreme Court established that where a party voluntarily assents to and

4

It would appear that the Russells desired to immediately pursue their appeal against the
Lundberg Defendants, which seem to be the principal targets of their action, rather than
re-plead and fully litigate their claims against the Backman Defendants. That was a
strategic decision with consequences.
12

recognizes the validity of a decree, the party waives any right to appeal matters that were
the subject of the decree.
In order to appeal, a judgment or order must have been entered against the will of
the appellant and be adverse to its interests; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless,
purely hypothetical, or advisory. See Utah R. App. P. 3-5; In re Discipline ofBabilis,
951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). Accordingly, it is well settled that where a party has
voluntarily dismissed an action or claim, the party cannot appeal the dismissal.5 This is
especially true where a party represented by sophisticated counsel in complex, multiparty/multi-claim litigation voluntarily dismisses certain claims with prejudice to advance
its litigation interests, which is precisely the case here.
Again, it does not appear from their briefing that the Russells have any intention to
appeal their own stipulated dismissal and the district court's subsequent confirming order.
But in any event, such an appeal would be baseless.

5

See Bhattacharya v. Copple, 898 F.2d 766, 768 (10th Cir. 1990); Seidman v. City of
Beverly Hills, 785 F.2d 1447, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986); Le Compte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528
F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976); Empire Volkswagen Inc. v. World-wide Volkswagen Corp.,
814 F.2d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 1987) (motion for voluntary dismissal of certain claims, made
after the district court granted partial summary judgment dismissing others, resulted in
waiver of right to resuscitate on appeal anything other than claims that were subject to
summary judgment motion); James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice §
303.10(2)(e)(i); Wicks v. County of Laramie, 36 F.3d 1106, 1994 WL 512434 (10th Cir.
1994) (unpublished disposition).
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B.

Except for the UPA Claim, All Claims Against the Backman
Defendants Have Been Abandoned on Appeal.

It is well settled that "[i]ssues that could have been raised in [an] appeal but were
not raised are waived." MacKay v. Jackson, 973 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 1998); see also
DeBry v. Cascade Enter., 935 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1997) (same); see also State v.
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^ 29 n.4, 94 P.3d 186 (declining to address issue not
raised by appellant); SME Indus, v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., 2001 UT
54, Tj 46 n.12, 28 P.3d 669 (declining to address arguments made at trial level but
"abandoned on appeal").
Under Utah law, an appellant is required to raise and brief all the grounds for an
appeal in its opening brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a); Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ^
9; 16 P.3d 540, 545. Moreover, as an appellate court is "not a depository in which [a
party] may dump the burden of argument and research," a court will not address issues
that are inadequately briefed. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ^J 30 n.12, 82
P.3d 1064 (quotations and citations omitted). Adequate briefing at least means that an
appellant's brief must "identify any error[s] by the trial court, refer to the facts or the
record, . . . cite applicable authority, [and] provide . . . meaningful factual [and] legal
analysis" based on that authority. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 250 (Utah App. 1992).
With the exception of their claim for violation of the UPA, the Russells' opening
brief contains no argument as to why their claims against the Backman Defendants
should be reinstated. Apart from the UPA analysis, the entire focus of the Russells' brief
is on overturning the dismissal of their claims against the Lundberg Defendants. The
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Russells do not provide this Court with any meaningful legal or factual analysis as to
errors the district court may have made in regard to their non-UPA claims against the
Backman Defendants. Therefore, except for their UPA claim, the Russells have
abandoned -intentionally, it appears - any arguments they may have had pertaining to
their other claims against the Backman Defendants.6 The trial court's judgment should
be summarily affirmed in respect to the Russells' fifth (restitution - mistake of fact),
sixth (restitution - mistake of law), eighth (unjust enrichment), thirteenth (civil
conspiracy), and fifteenth (punitive damages) claims.7
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE RUSSELLS
LACK STANDING TO BRING A DAMAGES CLAIM AGAINST THE
BACKMAN DEFENDANTS UNDER THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES
ACT; ALTERNATIVELY, THE RULING BELOW MAY BE AFFIRMED
ON THE GROUND THAT THE BACKMAN DEFENDANTS5 ALLEGED
ACTS DO NOT HAVE AN ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECT.
The Russells' alleged claim against the Backman Defendants for violation of the

Utah Unfair Practices Act is based on two theories: (1) price discrimination, and (2)
below-cost sales. First, they allege that the Backman Defendants "discriminated in the
price of the TSGs" by giving the Lundberg Defendants a lower price through a system of
commissions, which allegedly had an anti-competitive effect on the broader TSG market

Of course, the Russells cannot now raise such arguments for the first time in their reply
brief. See Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, U 9, 17 P.3d 1122 (an appellate court "will
not consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief); accord State v.
Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1003 n.2 (Utah App. 1993) (ordering that "reply brief
be stricken because it was untimely filed and addressed new issues").
As explained in the prior section, the Russells also abandoned their Fifth, Sixth, and
Thirteenth causes of action in the trial court when they agreed to dismiss them with
prejudice. To the extent all these claims are not abandoned, the Backman Defendants
adopt by reference the substantive arguments in the Lundberg Brief.
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because "the Lundberg defendants would not purchase TSGs from other title insurance
agencies." R. 25-26. Second, the Russells allege that the Backman Defendants sold
TSGs to the Lundberg Defendants for a below-cost price that was "not available to other
persons or entities" in the foreclosure business so as to secure the Lundberg Defendants'
extensive title work, again with allegedly anti-competitive effects on the broader market.
R. 26. The Russells assert that this unfair competition has injured them, but do not
explain how. R. 26, U 125. On appeal, the Russells defend their UPA claim principally
on the theory that the Backman Defendants sold TSGs to the Lundberg Defendants for
less than cost. See Brief of Appellants ("Russells' Brf."), 45-47.
The Lundberg Defendants have accurately set out why the Russells' UPA claim
against them fails as a matter of law. See Lundberg Brf., at 41-46. Those arguments
apply to the Backman Defendants and, accordingly, are adopted here by reference. The
Backman Defendants submit the following additional arguments in support of the district
court's dismissal of the Russells' UPA claim against them.
A.

Standard of Review on Appeal.

The district court dismissed the Russells' UPA claim on the pleadings pursuant to
Rule 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is adjudicated in the trial court and
on appeal "under the same standard as the grant for a motion to dismiss." Golding v.
Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 898 (Utah 1990). A motion to dismiss is
appropriate where the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts
which could be proved in support of its claim. Arrow Indus, v. Zions First Nat. Bank,
767 P.2d 936, 937 (Utah App. 1989). The allegations in the complaint are assumed true
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and the Court draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.
Cruz v. MiddlekauffLincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah 1996).
However, these deferential rules do not allow the Court to assume that a plaintiff
"can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated . . . the laws in
ways that have not been alleged.'5 Associated General Contractors v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). This Court should "also endeavor to
uphold a trial court's ruling [on a motion to dismiss], even if [it] must consider alternative
grounds on which the court below did not rely." O 'Neal v. Division of Family Services,
821 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1991). As noted above, the grant of a motion for judgment on
the pleadings is reviewed on appeal for correctness. Houghton, 2002 UT, f 7.
B.

The Russells Lack Standing to Bring a Damages Claim Under the UPA
Against the Backman Defendants.
1.

Applicable Standing Law.

"[Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied before a district
court may even entertain [a lawsuit]." Washington County Water Conservancy District v.
Morgan, 2003 UT 58, \ 1 n.2, 82 P.3d 1125; Harris v. Springville City, 712 P.2d 188,
190 (Utah 1986) ("[L]ack of standing is jurisdictional."); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,
1148 (Utah 1983) (holding that a party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of
the court). Accordingly, even assuming the Russells' allegations about market conditions
in the title insurance industry were plausible (they are not), if the Russells lack standing
their UPA claim cannot proceed.
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Standing can arise in several ways. The Legislature sometimes grants a party
"special statutory standing" to sue regardless of actual injury. Morgan, 2003 UT5 ^ 7. "A
plaintiff who has not been granted standing to sue by statute must either show that he has
or would suffer a 'distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the
outcome' of the case or meet one of the two exceptions to standing recognized in cases
involving 'important public issues.5" Morgan, 2003 UT, ^ 17 (citing Nat7 Parks &
Conservation Ass'n v. Bd of State Lands, 869 P.2d 9095 913 (Utah 1993); see also
Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986); Jenkins,
675 P.2d at 1148. The traditional "distinct and palpable injury" test for standing requires
that a plaintiff demonstrate a "particularized" injury to itself, not merely a general
grievance to society or (as in this case) the market at large. Soc'y of Prof {Journalists v.
Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987).
2.

The District Court Rejected the Russells' UP A Claim for Lack of
Standing.

The district court ruled that the Russells lacked standing to pursue their claim for
violation of the UPA. The court's cogent reasoning bears repeating:
Plaintiffs' fourteenth cause of action against Defendants is for alleged
violations of the Utah Unfair Practices Act ["UPA"], but the UPA does not
apply in this case. Plaintiffs are not competitors of any of the Defendants.
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs do not sell or buy a Trust Deed Sale
Guarantee ["TSG"] or other title product or service, and therefore were not
competing sellers or disfavored buyers of the TSGs and other title products
and services that were sold by Backman-Stewart and purchased by the
Lundberg Parties. In addition, Plaintiffs have not alleged, and no evidence
has been presented to suggest, that the commissions paid by BackmanStewart to the Lundberg Parties or any other practices of the Defendants
have damaged Plaintiffs in any way. Because Plaintiffs have not suffered
any distinct or palpable injury as a result of the commissions received by
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the Lundberg Parties from Backman-Stewart, Plaintiffs lack standing to
assert claims under the UPA against Defendants.
The UPA prohibits an entity from selling goods or services at less
than cost where the result of such pricing is the establishment of a
monopoly or the destruction of competition. Plaintiffs have presented no
facts showing that Defendants' practices had the effect of lessening
competition or creating a monopoly. To the contrary, Plaintiffs allege that
the amount the Lundberg Parties charged the lender or beneficiary under
Plaintiffs' trust deed for the TSGs that they bought from Backman Title
was more - not less - than the Lundberg Parties were required to pay for
those TSGs. That claim belies the applicability of the UPA to the facts of
this case.
Backman-Stewart's action in paying commissions to the Lundberg
Parties in recognition of Lundberg's ownership interest in BackmanStewart and for the large amount of business that the Lundberg Parties5
provided to Backman-Stewart does not violate the UPA.
R. 997-98.
3.

The UPA Does Not Grant the Russells Special Statutory Standing to
Bring a Damages Claim for Allegedly Non-Competitive Market
Practices.

On appeal, the Russells do not claim standing based on a special statutory grant
under the UPA or on some public interest exception, but rather (it appears) based on the
traditional "distinct and palpable injury" requirement. See Russells' Brf., at 47. Thus,
the Russells implicitly - and correctly - acknowledge that the UPA does not grant
consumers like them a special right to act as roving private attorneys general, bringing
damages actions whenever they believe anti-competitive market practices exist. In
addressing the standing issue, it is important to understand that the principal purpose of
the UPA is to protect competitors.
The Russells have focused their appeal of the UPA issue on an alleged scheme in
which the Backman Defendants sell TSGs at below cost to the Lundberg Defendants.
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The UPA prohibits below-cost sales under certain circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. §
13-5-7. However, sales-below-cost laws were enacted to protect actual competitors
injured by below-cost sales, not the class of end consumers who might at some later time
be injured by a less competitive market. One summary of American law explains the
purpose of such laws:
One of their chief aims is to protect small independent merchants from the
practice of larger merchants to sell below cost, since the small independent
merchants are unable to compete with those businesses which engage in
predatory pricing. It is possible, unless restrained by law, for a powerful
merchandiser with large resources to continue to sell at a loss in a
community and thereby drive weaker competitors out of the market,
establish a monopoly, and mulct the public. A second purpose of salesbelow-cost statutes is to end "loss-leaders" selling, which has been defined
as below-cost sales, especially of nationally known products, advertised
and made with the intent of luring customers to the store, where they may
be entrapped into purchasing other goods at marked-up prices that will
more than make up for the loss on the "leaders."
17 Am. Jur. 2d Monopolies, Etc. § 1077 (1996) ("Sales-Below-Cost Laws"). As the
Utah Supreme Court has noted, state UP As were "aim[ed] at alleviating the hardships of
'cut-throat' competition." Burt v. Woolsulate, Inc., 146 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1944).
Courts do not allow consumer and other non-competitors to use state UPA statutes
to bring damages claims challenging allegedly anti-competitive market practices that do
not harm them directly. In most instances, UPA statutes benefit consumers and noncompetitors indirectly by promoting a competitive marketplace. Thus, in Burt v.
Woolsulate, Inc., 146 P.2d 203, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim of price
discrimination under Utah's UPA where there was no injury to a competitor. The
plaintiff, Burt, was a sales representative of defendant Woolsulate, Inc. The parties had
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entered into a contract whereby Burt could purchase Woolsulate, Inc.'s product at a
certain price. As it turned out, the contract price was substantially lower than the price
Woolsulate, Inc. charged to "other purchasers who were in substantially the same
position as Burt." Id. at 205. Woolsulate, Inc. sought to avoid the price term of the
contract by claiming it violated the UPA's price discrimination provisions. The Utah
Supreme squarely rejected this argument on the ground that, because the contract
obligated Burt to sell at the same resale price as all other sales representatives, the
contract did not injure any of Burt's competitors. Id. ("There is no evidence to show that
any competitor of Burt was making a complaint."; "There is no evidence to show that the
sales representatives of [a competitor] company were injured by the low sales price to
Burt.").
Similarly, in Sivers Construction Co. v. United Steel Corporation, 538 P.2d 932
(Ore. 1975), Sivers sued to void a contract with a subcontractor, United Steel, that
allegedly violated Oregon's unfair practices statute prohibiting below-cost sales. United
Steel had contracted "to sell and erect steel" at a below-cost price for a building Sivers
was constructing, allegedly "with the intent to injure or destroy competition." Id. at 933.
The court rejected the claim on the ground that Sivers was not an injured competitor.
The court explained that the "purpose of prohibiting sales below cost is to prevent unfair
competition accomplished by damaging or destroying a competitor or competition." Id.
at 934. Hence, "[w]hen a seller has sold below cost with the intent to injure a competitor
and has injured a competitor, the competitor is one of the persons the legislature intended
should be able to bring an action." Id. In rejecting Sivers' claim, the court was
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"influenced by the fact that the injuries allegedly suffered by [Sivers] are not injuries to a
competitor and do not in any way tend to destroy competition. [Sivers] injuries were not
the kind of injuries that the statute was intended to prevent." Id. The court concluded by
stating that "'[u]nless action is instituted by a representative of the public such as the
Attorney General, or a Trade Commission, the plaintiff in a suit against selling below
cost is the competitive seller.'" Id. (quoting 1 Callman, Unfair Competition, Trademarks
and Monopolies (3d ed), pp. 939-40); cf. Waldv. Wilmington Trust Co., 552 A.2d 853
(Del. Super. 1988) (reading Delaware Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act "'in
conformity with the common law of unfair competition'" and thus holding that the statute
"is meant to provide a remedy for injuries to business interests, rather than for harm to
individual consumers") (citation omitted).
As these authorities indicate, the principal purpose of state UPAs is to protect
competitors from "'cut-throat' competition" {Burt, 146 P.2d at 205), thereby helping
ensure a competitive marketplace that ultimately benefits consumers. As noncompetitors, the Russells cannot bring a damages claim for violation of the UP A merely
by alleging that the Backman Defendants' pricing and commission practices for TSGs are
anti-competitive. That is simply not enough. To obtain standing, the Russells must
prove they have suffered a "distinct and palpable injury" from the challenged practice.
See Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-14 (damages claim under the UPA allowed only if person
"injured by the [illegal] act"). As shown next, the Russells have not alleged facts that
would support such a conclusion.
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4.

The Russells Lack Standing to Bring their UPA Claim Against the
Backman Defendants Because They Are Not Competitors and Have
Not Alleged or Shown a Particularized Injury.

On appeal, the Russells argue that the Lundberg Defendants obtained TSGs below
cost due to the commissions they received from the Backman Defendants, and that these
commissions were not justified by efficiencies due to volume. See Russells' Brf, at 4546. They state that this practice "translates into a much lower price [for the Lundberg
Defendants] for the title work than the same title product would cost from another title
company." Id. at 46-47. Allegedly, "[t]he other title companies cannot compete because
they will not engage in the illegal kickbacks paid to Lundberg." Id. at 47. The purported
anti-competitive result of all this is that the Lundberg Defendants send all their TSG work
to the Backman Defendants. Id.
Without more, these allegations and arguments cannot afford standing to the
Russells. The Russells admit they do not sell or directly purchase TSGs. Id. The anticompetitive injury they portray - whether termed below-cost-pricing or price
discrimination - directly impacts other title insurance companies, not the Russells. The
Russells cannot obtain standing by alleging market injuries that have supposedly befallen
the Backman Defendants' competitors. Any such suit must be brought by those
competitors.
Aware of this standing defect, the Russells argue that they have standing
nonetheless because they are the de facto purchasers of TSGs. Id. They claim that the
Lundberg Defendants pass "the cost of the TSGs on to them, albeit an inflated cost that
does not account for the kickback that Lundberg receives for the TSGs." Id. In other
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words, the Russells contend that the Lundberg Defendants buy TSGs from the Backman
Defendants for less than market cost and then essentially sell them for more than what
they paid - i.e., the Lundberg Defendants buy low and sell high. However, that is not
enough to establish standing.
First, the alleged injury is not the result of the Backman Defendants' conduct.
Their alleged practice of selling TSGs to the Lundberg Defendants at below cost does not
cause a "distinct and palpable injury" to the Russells even if the Russells are ultimately
charged more for the TSGs than the Lundberg Defendants paid. The Russells do not
allege that the Backman Defendants control what the Lundberg Defendants charge
lenders - who then ultimately charge borrowers - for their foreclosure services.
Whatever the purported injury, it is not "traceable" to the Backman Defendants and thus
standing does not arise to bring a damages action against them. Provo City Corp. v.
Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ^f 9, 86 P.3d 735 ("In order to meet the basic requirements of
standing, a party must allege that he or she has suffered or will imminently suffer an
injury that is fairly traceable to the conduct at issue ...."). As the case law makes clear,
for the Backman Defendants to injure the Russells through a below-cost pricing scheme
with the Lundberg Defendants, the Russells would have to be competitors in the title
insurance industry, which they clearly are not. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720 (1971) (indirectly affected parties do not have standing to sue under the antitrust
laws).
Moreover, it is undisputed that the price the Backman Defendants charge the
Lundberg Defendants is the same price they charge all other foreclosure trustees, and that
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the Lundberg Defendants pass this same price on to the lenders, who then pass it on to
borrowers seeking to reinstate their loans. R. 599-600, ^ 14; 785, ^ 14. In other words,
the allegedly illegal scheme does not result in below-cost pricing that threatens the
market positions of other competitors. Not only does this lack of a price differential
vitiate any possible claim by the Russells for price discrimination, it also precludes a
UPA claim for below-cost sales.8
As reviewed above, the Utah Supreme Court in Burt rejected these same types of
arguments under analogous circumstances. Although Burt was able to buy at a much
lower price than the other sales representatives, he could not as a matter of his contract
sell at a lower price. And because he did not sell below cost he could not be charged with
violating the below-cost-sales provision of the Utah UPA. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-7.
The mere fact that Burt was making large profits by buying low and selling high did not
give rise to a claim. The court reasoned:
Under the contract between Burt and the defendant, Burt was to sell only at
retail and to contractors in Salt Lake County. In such sales Burt was
required by the contract (in a resale price maintenance provision) to
maintain certain specified minimum prices in both retail and wholesale
sales. In this area he could not, therefore, sell for less than the prices which
would be charged by all other competitors selling as sales representatives
for Woolsulate, Inc
[Burt] was required in all areas to maintain the
minimum resale prices referred to above. While Burt may thus have been
able, because of the preferential price given to him, to make a larger profit
on sales made by him than other sales agents could make on comparable
sales, he was prohibited by the contract from cutting his prices so as to
injure other sales representatives. He was bound by the same resale prices
as were all other applicators. There is no evidence in the record to show
The Russells have not argued in their opening brief that they are the victims of price
discrimination in that other borrowers like them were charged less for TSGs than they
were.
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that the lower price to Burt would injure other sales representatives or that
it would "substantially lessen competition" or "tend to create a monopoly".
Burt, 146 P.2d at 205-06 (emphasis added).
Although the alleged Backman-Lundberg arrangement does not require the
Lundberg Defendants to bill lenders for the full price of TSGs, it is nevertheless
undisputed that the Lundberg Defendants in fact pass on the full price. Indeed, that is the
Russells' principal complaint. Thus, while it might be true that the Lundberg Defendants
(much like Burt) are able "to make a larger profit" on TSGs than others, there is
absolutely no allegation or fact showing that the Russells have suffered an anticompetitive injury. The cost ultimately passed through to the Russells is the same cost
they would have incurred if another foreclosure trustee had bought a TSG from
Backman-Stewart.
In short, the Russells have not adequately alleged or persuasively argued that they
suffered a particularized injury resulting from the alleged conduct of the Backman
Defendants. The mere assertion that the TSG market in Utah might be more competitive
without the Backman-Lundberg arrangement, and that the Russells might have benefited
thereby, is too indirect and speculative to give rise to standing. The district court
properly ruled that the Russells lack standing to bring a damages claim under the UPA
against the Backman Defendants.9

9

If this Court finds that judgment on the pleadings was not appropriate because of certain
factual allegations that must be assumed true, the Backman Defendants request that the
Court uphold the district court's ruling by converting their motion for judgment on the
pleadings into a motion for summary judgment based on the undisputed facts set forth in
the Lundberg Brief. See Doit, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 839 n.3 (Utah
26

C.

Alternatively, the Russells Have Not Demonstrated an AntiCompetitive Effect.

Even if they could show a personal injury sufficient to obtain standing, the
Russells still cannot demonstrate that the Backman Defendants' actions have had an anticompetitive effect on the broader market for TSGs - a prerequisite for any UPA claim
based on price discrimination or below-cost sales.10 This is an alternative ground upon
which the district court's ruling may be affirmed. Bailey, 2002 UT, ^f 135 n.3 (appellate
court may "affirm on any ground").
The alleged effect of the Backman-Lundberg commission arrangement is that the
Lundberg Defendants make substantial profits on overpriced TSGs and the Backman
Defendants retain the Lundberg Defendants' title insurance business. But there is
absolutely no evidence in the record or even a plausible allegation in the complaint
demonstrating how any of this could adversely impact competitive conditions in the
market for TSGs. Unlike predatory below-cost pricing, overcharging for TSGs does not
create an anti-competitive effect because competing foreclosure trustees and sellers of
TSGs are not harmed. Rather, it creates an opportunity and incentive for competitors to
bid down the price of TSGs and capture additional market share. There is no risk of any

1996) (appellate court may treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment
where affidavits and other evidence exist); see also Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^ 13,
52 P.3d 1158 ("[A]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record.") (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
10
See Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-3(l)(a) (claim for price discrimination requires proof that
"effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce"); id. § 13-5-7 (below-cost sales illegal where they
"unfairly diver[t] trade from a competitor or otherwise injur[e] a competitor").
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competitor being driven out of business. If the alleged Backman-Lundberg relationship
actually results in overpriced TSGs, as the Russells contend, then lenders will be less
likely to use their services because fewer borrowers in default will be able to pay the
inflated cost to reinstate their loans - a result that would clearly harm lenders, whose
financial interests lie in servicing viable loans rather than in liquidating foreclosed
properties.
In short, if the alleged Backman-Lundberg arrangement has the effects the
Russells claim, then lenders already have a strong market incentive to go elsewhere for
trustee and title services, or at least to demand that the ultimate cost of TSGs to the
borrower be lowered. Nowhere do the Russells allege - much less establish - facts
suggesting that the defendants in this case could prevent this obvious market response to
the supposed evils of the Backman-Lundberg arrangement. By their own allegations,
fully 30% of non-judicial foreclosures in Utah are handled by Lundberg's competitors.
R. 5. And a quick scan of the yellow pages reveals literally dozens of Utah title
insurance companies, each of which sells or could potentially sell TSGs. Far from
monopoly conditions, therefore, the market in Utah is well situated to correct or
financially punish any foreclosure trustee or title insurance company that attempts to
overcharge or corner the market for TSGs. That is the very essence of a competitive
market. The Russells have not established an anti-competitive market effect and thus,
regardless of standing, their UPA claim fails.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in the Lundberg Brief, the district
court's rulings dismissing the Russells' claims against the Backman Defendants should
be affirmed.
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ADDENDUM

13-4-1

COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 4

FAIR TRADE ACT [UNCONSTITUTIONAL]
13-4-1 to 13-4-9.

[Unconstitutional.]

1956

CHAPTER 5
UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT
Section
13-5-1.
13-5-2.
13-5-2.3.
13-5-2.5.
13-5-3.

13-5-4.
13-5-5.
13-5-6.
13-5-7.
13-5-8.
13-5-9.
13-5-10.
13-5-11.
13-5-12.
13-5-13.
13-5-14.
13-5-15.
13-5-16.
13-5-17.
13-5-18.

Short title.
"Person" defined.
Repealed.
Procedure to prevent unfair competition.
Unlawful discriminations — Burden of proof —
Taking or offering commissions — Payments
for benefit of customers — Discrimination
among purchasers — Inducing discriminations.
Return of net earnings or surplus by cooperatives
to members.
"Commerce" defined.
Liability of agents.
Sales at less than cost.
Advertising goods not prepared to supply.
Transactions involving more than one item —
Limitation on quantity of article or product
sold or offered for sale to any one customer.
Cost — Purchase price at forced sales.
Proceedings — Local cost surveys as evidence.
Sales exempt from chapter.
Contracts in violation declared illegal.
Injunctive relief — Damages — Immunity.
Penalty for violation of chapter.
Separability clause.
Policy of act.
Cost — Separate entities of business.

13-5-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Unfair
Practices Act."
1953
13-5-2. "Person" defined.
When used in this act, unless the context otherwise requires, the term "person" means an individual, a corporation,
a partnership, an association, a joint stock company, a business trust or any unincorporated organization.
1953
13-5-2.3.

Repealed.

1996

13-5-2.5. Procedure to prevent unfair competition.
Unless otherwise provided in this chapter:
(1) Unfair methods of competition in commerce or
trade are unlawful and shall be enjoined as provided by
this section.
(2) The division may prevent persons, except banks,
common carriers, and other public utilities subject to
regulation, from using unfair methods of competition in
commerce or trade.
(3) If the division has reason to believe that any person
has been or is using unfair methods of competition in
commerce or trade, and it appears to the division that it
would be in the interest of the public to stop the unfair
methods of competition, the division may begin adjudicative proceedings and may issue an order directing the
person to cease and desist from using those methods of
competition.
(4) The division may file suit to enjoin and restrain a
person from conducting the unfair competition if:
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(a) after the adjudicative proceedings, the executive director believes that the method of competition
in question is prohibited by this section; or
(b) no hearing is requested; and
(i) the person accused of unfair competition
does not cease the unfair competition; or
(ii) the person accused of unfair competition
begins the unfair competition again after discontinuing it.
(5) The attorney general, or the county attorneys in
their respective counties, shall conduct unfair competition
proceedings upon request by the division.
(6) No order of the division or judgment of the court to
enforce the order may waive the liability of any person
under the antitrust laws or other laws of this state.
(7) (a) Complaints, orders, notices, and the processes
of the division may be served by anyone authorized by
the division by:
(i) delivering a copy to the person to be served,
to a member of the partnership to be served, or to
the president, secretary, other executive officer,
or a director of the corporation to be served;
(ii) leaving a copy at the principal office or
place of business of the person; or
(iii) sending by registered mail a copy addressed to the person at his principal place of
business or office,
(b) The verified return by the person serving the
complaint, order, notice, or other process setting forth
the manner of service or the return post-office receipt
for the complaint, order, notice, or other process sent
by registered mail is proof of service.
1987
13-5-3.

Unlawful discriminations — Burden of proof—
Taking or offering commissions — Payments
for benefit of customers — Discrimination
a m o n g purchasers — Inducing discriminations.
(1) (a) It is unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either
or any of the purchasers involved in such discrimination
are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for
use, consumption, or resale within the state and where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall prevent:
(i) differentials which make only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the different methods or quantities
in which such commodities are to such purchasers
sold or delivered;
(ii) persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or
merchandise in commerce from selecting their own
customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade; and
(iii) price changes from time to time in response to
changing conditions affecting the market for or toe
marketability of the goods concerned, such as, but no
limited to, actual or imminent deterioration of V&'
ishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good fa1
in discontinuance of business in the goods concernf •
(2) Upon proof being made, at any suit on a comply
under this section, that there has been discrimination in P n
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rvices or facilities furnished or in payment for services or
° r ^Uies to be rendered, the burden of rebutting the prima& . s e thus made by showing justification shall be upon the
n charged with a violation of this section. However
^hinff ta this chapter shall prevent a seller rebutting the
n
°. a .f ac ie case thus made by showing that his lower price or
^ f u r n i s h i n g of services or facilities to any purchaser or
hasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low
^ • e of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by
Competitor.
(3) It is unlawful for any person engaged in commerce in
, course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or
pt anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other
mpensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof,
pt f0r and not exceeding the actual cost of such services
pndered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods,
wares, or merchandise.
(4) It is unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to
nay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for
the benefit of a customer of such person in the course of such
COEQinerce as compensation or in consideration for any services
or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of
any products, or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered
for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration
is available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities.
(5) It is unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of
one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a
commodity bought for resale with or without processing, by
contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the
furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the
processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on
proportionally equal terms.
(6) It is unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a
discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section.
1993

13-5-4. Return of n e t earnings or surplus by cooperatives to members.
Nothing in this act shall prevent a cooperative association
from returning to its members, producers or consumers the
whole, or any part of, the net earnings or surplus resulting
from its trading operations, in proportion to their purchases or
sales from, to or through the association.
1953
13-5-5. "Commerce" defined.
Definition of "commerce" as used in this bill shall be construed to mean intrastate commerce in the state of Utah.
1953

13-5-6. Liability of agents.
Any person who, either as director, officer or agent of any
firm or corporation or as agent of any person, violating the
provisions of this act, assists or aids directly or indirectly, in
such violation shall be responsible therefor equally with the
person, firm or corporation for whom or for which he acts.
1953

13-5-7. Sales at l e s s than cost.
(1) It is hereby declared that any advertising, offer to sell,
or sale of any merchandise, either by retailers or wholesalers,
a
t less than cost as defined in this act with the intent and
purpose of inducing the purchase of other merchandise or of
unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring a competitor, impairs and prevents fair competition, injures public welfare, is unfair competition contrary to public
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policy and the policy of this act and is declared to be a violation
of this act.
(2) (a) When used in this act, the term "cost" as applied to
production shall include the cost of raw materials, labor,
and all overhead expenses of the producer.
(b) When used in this act, the term "cost to the wholesaler" shall mean the invoice cost of the merchandise to
the wholesaler or the replacement cost of the merchandise
to the wholesaler, whichever is lower; less all trade
discounts except customary discounts for cash; to which
shall be added
(i) freight charges not otherwise included in the
invoice cost or the replacement cost of the merchandise as herein set forth; and
(ii) cartage to the retail outlet if done or paid for by
the wholesaler, which cartage cost, in the absence of
proof of a lesser cost, shall be deemed to be 3A of 1% of
the cost to the wholesaler as herein set forth after
adding thereto freight charges but before adding
thereto cartage.
(c) When used in this act, the term "cost to the retailer"
shall mean the invoice cost of the merchandise to the
retailer within 30 days prior to the date of sale, or the date
of offering for sale, or the replacement cost of the merchandise to the retailer, whichever is lower; less all trade
discounts except customary discounts for cash; to which
shall be added.
(i) freight charges not otherwise included in the
invoice cost or the replacement cost of the merchandise as herein set forth; and
(ii) cartage to the retail outlet if done or paid for by
the retailer, which cartage cost, in the absence of
proof of a lesser cost, shall be deemed to be 3Aofl% of
the cost to the retailer as herein defined after adding
thereto freight charges but before adding thereto
cartage and markup, and a markup to cover a proportionate part of the cost of doing business, which
markup, in the absence of proof of a lesser cost, shall
be 6% of the cost to the retailer as herein set forth
after adding thereto freight charges and cartage, but
before adding thereto a markup.
(d) When used in this act, the term "replacement cost"
shall mean the cost per unit at which the merchandise
sold or offered for sale could have been bought by the
seller at any time within 30 days prior to the date of sale
or the date upon which it is offered for sale by the seller if
bought in the same quantities as the seller's last purchase
of the said merchandise.
1992
13-5-8. Advertising goods not p r e p a r e d to supply.
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in business
within the state to advertise goods, wares, or merchandise
that person is not prepared to supply.
1993
13-5-9.

Transactions involving more than one item —
Limitation on quantity of article or product
sold or offered for sale to a n y one customer.
(1) For the purpose of preventing evasion of this act in all
sales involving more than one item or commodity the vendor's
or distributor's selling price shall not be below the cost of all
articles, products, and commodities included in such transactions. Each article, product, or commodity individually advertised or offered for sale, shall be individually subject to the
requirements of Section 13-5-7, when sold with other articles,
products, or commodities.
(2) Under this section, proof of limitation of the quantity of
any article or product sold or offered for sale to any one
customer of a quantity less than the entire supply thereof
owned or possessed by the seller or which he is otherwise
authorized to sell at the place of such sale or offering for sale,
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together with proof that the price at which the article or
product is so sold or offered for sale is in fact below its cost,
raises a presumption of the purpose or the intent of the sale
being to injure competitors or destroy competition, and is
unlawful. This section applies only to sales by persons conducting a retail business, the principal part of which involves
the resale to consumers of commodities purchased or acquired
for t h a t purpose, as distinguished from persons principally
engaged in the sale to consumers of commodities of their own
production or manufacture.
There shall be no circumvention of the provisions of this act
relating to the quantity of articles or products any one
customer may purchase by requiring presentation of coupons,
certificates, special purchase authorizations, or any other
procedures designed in any way to limit quantity of purchases
as provided herein.
1965
13-5-10. Cost — Purchase price at forced sales.
In establishing the cost of a given article, product or
commodity to the distributor and vendor, the invoice cost of
said article, product or commodity purchased at a forced,
bankrupt, closeout sale or other sale outside of the ordinary
channels of trade may not be used as a basis for justifying a
price lower than one based upon the replacement cost as of the
date of said sale of said article, product or commodity replaced
through the ordinary channels of trade, unless said articles,
product or commodity is kept separate from goods purchased
in the ordinary channels of trade and unless said article,
product or commodity is advertised and sold as merchandise
purchased at a forced, bankrupt, closeout sale, or by means
other than through the ordinary channels of trade, and said
advertising shall state the conditions under which said goods
were so purchased, and the quantity of such merchandise to be
sold or offered for sale.
1953
13-5-11. Proceedings — Local cost surveys as evidence.
In any injunction proceedings or in the prosecution of any
person as officer, director or agent, it shall be sufficient to
allege and prove the unlawful intent of the person, firm or
corporation for whom or for which he acts. Where a particular
trade or industry of which the person, firm or corporation
complained against is a member, has an established cost
survey for the locality and vicinity in which the offense is
committed, the said cost survey shall be deemed prima-facie
evidence in proving the costs of the person, firm or corporation
complained against within the provisions of this act, unless
the person, firm or corporation shall have kept a continuous,
accurate and comprehensive record of the cost of business of
the person, firm or corporation, in which event said record
may be introduced to rebut the cost survey.
1953
13-5-12. Sales exempt from chapter.
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any sale
made:
(a) in closing out in good faith the owner's stock or any
part thereof for the purpose of discontinuing his trade in
any such stock or commodity, and in the case of the sale of
seasonal goods, or to the bona fide sale of perishable goods
to prevent loss to the vendor by spoilage or depreciation;
provided, prior notice is given to the public thereof;
(b) when the goods are damaged or deteriorated in
quality, and prior notice is given to the public thereof;
(c) by an officer acting under the orders of any court;
(d) in an endeavor made in good faith to meet the legal
prices of a competitor as herein defined selling the same
article, product or commodity in the same locality or trade
area;
(e) by manufacturers, producers, brokers or wholesale
distributors meeting in good faith prices established by
interstate competition regardless of cost; provided, such
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prices are available to all persons buying on like terms
and conditions in the same locality and vicinity.
(2) Any person, who performs work upon, renovates, alters
or improves any personal property belonging to another person, except necessary repairs due to damage in transit, shall
be construed to be a vendor within the meaning of this
chapter.
1997
13-5-13. Contracts in violation declared illegal.
Any contract expressed or implied, made by any person, in
violation of any of the provisions of this act is declared to be an
illegal contract and no recovery thereon shall be had.
1953
13-5-14. Injunctive relief — Damages — Immunity.
Any person or the state of Utah may maintain an action to
enjoin a continuance of any act in violation of this chapter,
and, if injured by the act, for the recovery of damages. If, in
such action, the court finds that the defendant is violating or
has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, it shall
enjoin the defendant from a continuance of the violation. It is
not necessary that actual damages to the plaintiff be alleged
or proved. In addition to such injunctive relief, the plaintiff is
entitled to recover from the defendant three times the amount
of the actual damages sustained or $2,000, whichever is
greater, plus court costs.
Any defendant in an action brought under this section may
be required to testify. The books and records of such defendant
may be brought into court and introduced, by reference, into
evidence. No information so obtained may be used against the
defendant as a basis for a misdemeanor prosecution under this
chapter.
1983
13-5-15. Penalty for violation of chapter.
Any person, whether as principal, agent, officer or director,
for himself or for another person, who knowingly violates this
chapter, is guilty of a misdemeanor for each violation. Upon
conviction he shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $5,000,
or by imprisonment not to exceed 12 months or by both. 1983
13-5-16. Separability clause.
If any section, sentence, clause or phrase of this act is for
any reason held to be unconstitutional, such decision shall not
affect the validity of the remaining portions of the act. The
Legislature hereby declares that it would have passed this act,
and each section, sentence, clause or phrase thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more other sections, sentences,
clauses or phrases be declared unconstitutional.
1953
13-5-17. Policy of act.
The Legislature declared that the purpose of this act is to
safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of
monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices by which fair and
honest competition is destroyed or prevented. This act shall be
liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be subl95S
served.
13-5-18. Cost — Separate entities of business.
For the purposes of this act, manufacturing, jobbing, wholesaling and retailing activities of a person shall be considered
separate and distinct entities of business in establishing ^ d
l95S
determining cost of any article, product or commodity.
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